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THE RULE IN WHITBY v. MITCHELL-ITS
PRESENT STATUS AS SHOWN BY
RECENT CASES
The Real Property Commissioners in their third report, pub-
lished in the year 1883, preface that valuable section of the report
which deals with perpetuities by remarking that:
"All future interests, not being remainders, are restrained
in their limits by the rules of law relating to Perpetuities.11
2
The words "not being remainders" are important. Are remain-
ders subject to no rule which restrains their creation? or if they
are subject to a rule, what is that rule?
The rule, usually called the rule against perpetuities, which
makes void any executory interest in property which does not
necessarily vest indefeasibly within a period of one or more
lives in being and twenty-one years afterwards, is comparatively
recent. The exact form of it was only finally settled, in the
year in which the commissioners made their report, by the case
of Cadell v. Palmer.3  This rule makes void the interest or
limitation which offends it, not because there would be a "per-
petuity" in the older sense of the term,4 but because the interest
1 (1889) 42 Ch. Div. 494; (i8o) 44 Ch. Div. 85.
2 p. 29.
3 (833) i CI. & F. 372.
4 "A perpetuity is the settlement of an estate or an interest in tail, with
such remainders expectant upon it as are in no sort in the power of the
tenant in tail in possession to dock by any recovery or assignment." Lord




or limitation is too remote. To avoid confusion this rule will
be called the rule in Cadell v. Palmer.
If there were only one rule-that in Cadell v. Palmer-which
applied to every interest in every kind of property including
legal remainders, the law would be slightly simpler than it
actually is. Some judges in England have endeavored to make
this simplification, and have held that the rule in Cadell v. Palmer
applies both to legal remainders and to common-law conditions.
At present one cannot tell whether this bold step is likely to suc-
ceed, as the matter has not come before the Court of Appeal or
the House of Lords. The sterner school of real property lawyers
are pained by the boldness of the judges and their disregard of
the history of the law. The late Mr. Challis thought that the
question whether legal remainders could be subject to the rule
in Cadell v. Palmer ought never to have arisen.
"It implies an anachronism which may be said to trench
upon absurdity. It must be borne in mind that judges are
very ready to extend the rule against perpetuities; and
that, though the historical argument against extending
the rule to legal limitations cannot easily be answered, it
can easil r be disregarded."'
Is there another rule which applies to remainders? The late
John Chipman Gray says, "No." 6  In England, however, the
Court of Appeal have decided that there is such a rule-usually
named after the leading case of Whitby v. Mitchell, but the
precise application of this rule has recently given rise to some
difficulty. To understand the position it is necessary to examine
the cases.
In Whitby v. Mitchell by a post-nuptial settlement made in
pursuance of ante-nuptial articles, freehold lands were limited to
the use of the husband and wife successively for life, with
remainder to the use of their issue (born before any appoint-
ment made) as they should by deed appoint. Having had issue,
two daughters only, they by deed appointed one moiety of the
lands to the use of one daughter for life for her separate use
without power of anticipation, and after her decease to the use of
such person or persons as she should by will appoint, and in
default of appointment to the use of her children living at the
5 Challis, Real Property (3d ed.) pp. 197, 2o0.
6 Gray, Rule against Perpetuities (3d ed.) Appendix, K.
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date of that deed equally as tenants in common in fee. Justice
Kay and the Court of Appeal held that the power of appointment
by will, given to the daughter, and the remainder in default of
appointment, were void.
Why the power of appointment was held to be void does not
appear clearly from the judgments. It must have been under the
rule in Cadell v. Palmer that the power was void because the
daughter was unborn at the date of the ante-nuptial articles.7
The reason for the remainder being void is found in the rule
that where land is limited to an unborn person for life with
remainder to a child of such unborn person the remainder is void.
Justice Kay said:
"The law as to land has always been that you cannot
limit an estate to an unborn person for life, with remain-
der to the issue of that unborn person."
Lord Justice ,Cotton said:
"You cannot have a limitation for the life of an unborn
person, with a limitation after his death to his unborn
children to take as purchasers."0
Lord Justice Lindley quotes with approval Butler's statement:
"If land is limited to an unborn person during his life
a remainder cannot be limited, so as to confer an estate by
purchase on that person's issue," and adds, "But it is
said that the old rule became obsolete, or merged or con-
fused in the more modem law of perpetuities. Butler,
however, shows that this is a mistake. The rule against
perpetuities was invented much later, on account of the
law of shifting uses and executory devises. When shift-
ing uses and executory devises were invented it became
necessary to impose some limit upon them, and the doc-
trine of perpetuities has arisen from that necessity.""
In Whitby v. Mitchell the limitations were legal. In In re
Nash" upon the marriage of A and B, land was assured to
trustees upon trust after the decease of the survivor of A and
7 See Wollaston v. King (1868) L. R. 8 Eq. 165.
6 Whitby v. Mitchell (1889) 42 Ch. D. 494, 5oo.
0 Whitby v. Mitchell (i8go) 44 Ch. D. 85, 89.
10 Whitney v. Mitchell (i8go) 44 Ch. D. 85, 92.
11 [IgOg] 2 Ch. 450; [igio] I Ch. I.
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B for their issue (to be born before the appointment) as A should
by deed or will appoint. By his will A appointed that the trustees
should stand possessed of one moiety of the land in trust for his
daughter L. for life, and after her death in trust for her two
named children; and as to the other moiety in trust for his
other daughter J. for life and after her death in trust for her two
named daughters absolutely. It was held by Justice Eve and the
Court of Appeal, following Monypenny v. Dering,1 2 that the
rule applied to equitabl.e as well as to legal estates and that the
limitations in favour of the children of L. and J. were void.
The point has recently arisen in a more difficult form. If
land is devised to A (a living person, for life) with remainder
to any widow who may survive him, with remainder to A's chil-
dren, is the ultimate remainder good? A may marry a person
who was unborn at the testator's death; A may have children by
such a person. It is, therefore, possible that in the result there
may be a life estate to an unborn person followed by a remainder
to her children. It is to be observed, first, that the children are
the children of a born person (A) as well as being the children
of an unborn person; secondly, that A's wife may not in fact be
unborn at the testator's death.
Parenthetically, it may be remarked that this state of affairs
does not occur in the usual form of real property settlement.
When the eldest son, who is tenant in tail, becomes of age and,
with his father's consent, disentails and resettles the property,
the limitations (after the father's life estate) are to the son for
life with remainder to his sons successively in tail, with power
to the son to charge a jointure for his widow and portions for
his younger children. A jointure is a rent charge secured by a
term not a life estate in the property, so that no question as
to the rule will arise. But recently where a small amount of
land treated as an investment is settled, there has been a tendency
to give a life interest to a surviving widow or husband as if the
property were personalty. It is this that has given rise to the
recent cases.
In the case of In re Park's Settlement,1 3 Laura Park by deed
poll conveyed a freehold house to the use of J. F. (a bachelor)
during the joint lives of Laura Park and J. F., and in case of
the death of J. F., in the lifetime of Laura Park, leaving a widow
12 (1852) 2 D. M. & G. 145.
13 [1914] 1 Ch. 595.
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surviving, then to the use of such widow for life and after her
decease to the use of such of J. F.'s issue as should survive him
and attain twenty-one years. J. F. subsequently married and
died leaving his widow and one daughter surviving him.
Justice Eve, in giving judgment, said:
"It is contended that the gift to the issue is void alto-
gether, because the limitation to the use of J. F.'s widow
for life with remainder to the use of the children who
might be born of her as his wife involves a double possibil-
ity or contingency in that J. F. being a bachelor might
marry a lady who was not born at the date of the deed.
These limitations it is argued offend against what has been
called the rule against double possibilities, but what is
more accurately described by Farwell, L. J., in In re Nash
as 'the rule against limiting land to an unborn child for
life with remainder to his unborn child.' I think upon
the authorities that this contention is well founded.'
4
rhe statement that the issue are to be those born of J. F.'s
widow does not appear to be accurate. It should also be noticed
that, as J. F. married three years after the deed poll, the widow
was certainly alive when Laura Park made the settlement, so
that in fact there was no limitation to the issue of an unborn
person. Further, the issue were described as issue of J. F. (a
living person).
In re Park's Settlement was considered in In re Bullock's Will
Trusts."5  There a testator directed the trustees of his will to
pay a third of the rent and profits of his residuary estate to his
niece I. B. (who was then a spinster) for life, and after her
death to pay the same to any husband with whom she might
intermarry and who should survive her, during his life. After
the death of both, the trustees were to sell the estate and hold the
proceeds of one-third in trust for the children of I. B. attaining
twenty-one, and if I. B. should die without leaving a child who
should attain a vested interest, then in trust for the children
of S. I. B. married, but died without having had issue. It
was contended that the gift to the children of I. B. was void
and that this involved the avoidance of the subsequent limita-
tion to the children of S. In the course of his judgment Justice
Sargant said.:
'4 In re Park's Settlement [ 1914] I Ch. 595.
Is [1915] 1 Ch. 493.
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"At first sight the rule" (i. e. the rule that if land is
limited to an unborn person during his life a remainder
cannot be limited so as to confer an estate by purchase on
that person's issue) "would not appear to be applicable to
the facts either here or in In re Park's Settlement, since
in both cases the children to take were defined as being
the children of a living and named person who may be
referred to as the praepositus. To this, however, it is
replied that, though the prepositus was living, the surviv-
ing husband or wife of the prapositus might have been
unborn at the date of the creation of the limitations, and
that the children of the prmpositus to take or some of
them may be children by the surviving husband or wife,
in which event they would in fact be children of an unborn
person to whom a prior life interest had been limited.
In re Park's Settlement is obviously a decision of far
reaching application and great importance."
The learned judge then considered the cases of In re Nash, In
re Frost,18 Whitting v. , hitting,17 and continued:
"Before In re Park's Settlement, therefore, such direct
authority as there is seems to me rather in favour of than
against such a limitation as is now in question. And from
the point of view of principle also I think that the limita-
tion should be supported. No doubt issue must be the
issue of two parents. But in general .. ........
issue to take under a limitation are defined and qualified
as the issue of one parent only whom I call the propositus,
and the individuality of the other parent is not taken into
account in any way . . . . And it seems to me that
in such cases attention should be exclusively concentrated
on the particular praepositus indicated by the will or settle-
ment, and that to enter upon conjectures as to the possible
date of birth or other circumstances of the husband or
wife of the prxpositus would only be to introduce doubt
and confusion ibto what ought to be a very definite and
ascertainable rule of law.'
' 8
I-le held that the limitations were good.
It seems to have been assumed that the limitation to I. B.'s
children was a remainder, and not an executory devise. The
most recent case is that of In re Clarke's Settlement Trust9
where an appointment by will was made upon certain trusts some
of which were void under the rule in Whitby v. Afitchell. Part
16 (1889) 43 Ch. Div. 246.
17 (i9o8) 53 Sol. J. 1oo.
il [r95] i Ch. 493, 499, 50,-502.
19 [1916] i Ch. 467.
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of the land had been sold and invested in personalty before the
will came into operation. It was held that the invalidity only
extended to the real property as it existed when the will came
into operation. Referring to the rule in Whitby v. Mitchell,
Justice Younger said:
"Much has been said as to the meaning and propriety of
that rule, while some lawyers, and probably most publicists
do regret that the American view has not prevailed in
this country and that a rule so artificial and now without
defenders or necessity, has not been abrogated by the
more modern rule against perpetuities, it is clear that in
no Court other than the House of Lords can the existence
of the rule be questioned, nor can its application to equit-
able as well as to legal estates in land be disputed."
20
It will be noticed that Justice Eve, in In re Park's Settlement,
relied up6n the cases of In re Frost and Whitting v. Whitting.
In the former, the limitation in effect was to a daughter of the
testator for life, then to any husband of hers for life, and after
the death of the survivor to the use of the children of the daugh-
ter as she should appoint, and in default, to the use of all the
children who should be living at the death of the survivor.
Justice Kay held that the limitation to the children was void on
two grounds: (i) that it was a possibility on a possibility or a
double contingency; (2) that the rule in Cadell v. Palmer applied
to legal remainders. Justice Sargant, in it re Bullock's [ill
Trusts,2 ' considers that In re Nash decided that there is no rule
against a possibility on a possibility except in the form of the
rule in Whitby v. Mitchell and that the first ground was not valid.
It will be noticed that the remainder to the children could not
vest until the death of the survivor of the daughter and her
(probably unborn) husband, while in In re Park's Settlement the
issue of J. F. took vested interests within twenty-one years of
his death, although they would not fall into possession until the
death of his (possibly unborn) widow.
Justice Sargant deals with .Vhitting v. Whitting as follows:
"The case of Whitting v. Whitting is one in which no
indication whatever is given of the arguments or the cases
cited and in which the report of the judgment is very
scanty particularly as regards the point now in question.
The limitation there was to a person who was on the facts
20 [1916] i Ch. 467, 476-477.
21 [19151 Ch. 493, 5oo.
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held to be an original settl6r for life, then to any wife
he might leave surviving for life, and then to his chil-
dren attaining twenty-three. This last limitation was
obviously bad within the modern rule against perpetuities
as not being necessarily confined within a life in being and
twenty-one years after. But the learned judge in declar-
ing it bad on this ground, is reported to have indicated
a view that it was also bad as succeeding an estate for
life to a parent possibly unborn at the date of the settle-
ment and so infringing also the old rule against perpetui-
ties. This expression of view was entirely unnecessary
for the decision of the case, and cannot, I think, be
regarded as a deliberate judgment based on any consid-
eration of prior cases. It appears to be hardly, if at all,
more than an obiter dictum."
22
By the "old rule" the learned judge means that in Whitby v.
Mitchell, by the "modern rule" that in Cadell v. Palmer. But
in Whitting v. Whitting the settlor had a power of appointment
which is thus dealt with by Justice Neville in his judgment:
"It remains to consider whether the trust for all or
such one or more exclusively of the others or other of the
issue of E. M. W. (the settlor) by any wife to be born
during the life of the said E. M. W. as the said E. M.
W. shall by deed or will appoint, was capable of being
valid by exercise in favour of his daughter by will.
On the one hand it is said that it is a limitation in
favour of such of the unborn children of a possibly
unborn wife as E. M. W. may select, and conse-
quently obnoxious to the rule already referred to; while
on the other hand. it is said that it operates merely to
give a remainder in the daughter vesting immediately
upon the death of the settlor and consequently is free
from objection. In my opinion the donee of a particular
power cannot appoint to any person to whom the original
creator of the power could not have appointed. See Far-
well, Powers (2d ed.) p. 286 The test of the validity
of the estates raised being to place them in the deed
creating the power in lieu of the power itself. Here
the settlor and the donee of the power are one and the
same person, but if the limitation in the settlement had
been after a life estate to an unborn person, to unborn
persons to be born in the lifetime of the settlor, it appears
to me such limitations would still be obnoxious to the
rule." 23
This point is not dealt with by Justice Sargant, and it is sub-
22 [I915] i Ch. 493, 5oo-5oi.
23 (1908) 53 Sol. J. Ioo.
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mitted, that in effect Justice Neville decided that, if land is
limited to A for life with remainder to any wife who may survive
him for life with remainder to such of A's children as he shall
appoint, the limitation is void as to the power of appointment.
The inconvenience of the decision in In re Park's Settlement
is evident. If land is limited in the usual way to A (a bachelor)
with remainder to his first and other sons successively in tail,
with power to create a rent charge by way of jointure in favour
of any wife who may survive him, the limitations are good; but
if instead of having power to create a jointure a life interest was
limited to any wife who might survive A, then the limitations to
the sons would be void. It is, therefore, fairly safe to prophesy
that In re Park's Settlement will be treated as overruled by In
re Bullock's Will Trust. Soon after the last sentence was writ-
ten it was confirmed by the case of In re Garnham.
24
In In re Garnham, the testator by a will made in 1837 devised
real estate to trustees upon trust during the life of his son T.
and after his death until the same should be sold under the trusts
thereinafter declared; namely, to pay the rents to his son T.
for life, and after his death to any woman whom T. should
marry during his life, and after the decease of the survivor of T.
and his wife, to sell the real estate and stand possessed of the
proceeds upon trust for the children of T. at twenty-one or
marriage. In the event of there being no such child of T. (which
event happened) the real estate was to be held in trust for the
testator's other children who should survive T., and the children
or child then living of any of the testator's children who should
have died in the lifetime of T. leaving children; in equal shares
per stirpes. T. was a bachelor at the testator's death. He after-
wards married a wife, who survived him, but he had no issue.
The trust for sale clearly infringed the rule in Cadell v. Palmer
and was void, but this would not cause the beneficial inter-
ests to fail if they must vest within the period required by
the rule.2 5 The gift to T.'s children and the gift in default to
the testator's other children and grandchildren must vest within
twenty-one years of T.'s death, and therefore do not offend the
rule in Cadell v. Palmer. But if In re Park's Settlement was
correct, the gift of T.'s children would be bad under the rule in
Whitby v. Mitchell, and it might follow that the gift to the
testator's other child was bad as being dependent on a void
limitation.
24 [1916] 2 Ch. 413.
25 In re Daveron [1893] 3 Ch. 421.
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Justice Neville said:
"There are two point arising in the present case. The
first is, what is the result, with regard to -the rule against
perpetuities, of a gift to a bachelor for life with remainder
to any wife he may marry with remainder to his chil-
dren? There has apparently been a difference of judicial
opinion on that point. We have first a case before Kay, J.,
of In re Frost, and that is followed by Whitting v. Whit-
ting, a decision of my own, in which I seem to have dealt
with the will before me very much in the way in which
Kay, J., dealt with the will before him in the case of
In re Frost. The gifts were obviously bad on the face
of them under the rule against perpetuities because the
limitation was to children at twenty-five in the case before
Kay, J., and at twenty-three in the case which I decided.
There was a question in both cases whether in the circum-
stances it was a gift to the unborn children of an unborn
person following on a life interest to that unborn person.
Then came a decision of Eve, J., in In re Park's Settlement,
in which he purported to follow those two decisions, and
finally the matter came before Sargant, J., in the case of
In re Bullock's Will Trusts, in which he held that such
limitations were good. There is also a second point which
he decided in the case before him; namely, that the gift
in question was an independent gift, and not a gift in
remainder. Having considered the matter as carefully as
I can, I have come to the conclusion that Sargant, J.'s view
is the sounder view on the point. I do not think that the
fact that the children referred to might have been the
children of an unborn person who took a tenancy for
life, as well as the son, the bachelor, who took another
tenancy for life, can effect the matter. It seems to me
that upon the determination of the tenancy for life given
to an existing person 'the class is ascertained, although
the enjoyment may be postponed during a life tenancy of
a person who may have been unborn at the date of the.
gift. In my opinion that does not offend against the
rule against perpetuities. Consequently I propose to fol-
low Sargant, J.'s decision in this respect. I may say
that I have mentioned the matter to Eve, J., and he
agrees with me that In re Bullock's Will Trusts is a
sounder decision on this point than the decisions which
preceded it.
' '26
His Lordship then dealt with the question whether the real
estate was converted. In this judgment the expression, "the rule
against perpetuities," is used three times. On the second occa-
sion it appears to mean the rule in Cadell v. Palmre; on the third
2 6 1in re Garnhzam [1916] 2 Ch. 413, 415-416.
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to mean the rule in Whitby v. Mitchell; and this seems to be
the sense in which it is used at the beginning of the judgment.
In re Frost did not deal with the rule in Whitby v. Mitchell, but
Re Whitting, as I have pointed out, was a decision on both rules.
But although Justice Neville's judgment is not so full as might
have been wished for, it is now clear that, in courts of first in-
stance, In re Park's Settlement is out of the way. I wish, how-
ever, to suggest that the courts may not have adopted the right
principle in dealing with the limits to the rule in Whitby v.
Mitchell. I do this with some diffidence as the theory that I put
forward is not hinted at in any of the reported cases.
The rule in Whitby v. Mitchell is an old rule dealing with
remainders, 27 the rule in Cadell v. Palmer is a modern rule
dealing with executory and equitable interests. Prior to the
Real Property Amendment Act, 1845,28 and the 'Contingent
Remainders Act, 1877, legal contingent remainders were always
liable to fail or be destroyed. It was because executory
devises and equitable estates and interests were not liable to
failure or destruction in the same way as legal remainders that
the rule which ultimately became that in Cadell v. Pahner was
evolved. In applying this rule possible, not actual, events are
regarded.2 9  If any limitation might in any event however
improbable, infringe the rule, that limitation is void. But it is
evident that if such a principle were applied to rules which regu-
late contingent remainders, they would continually be made void.
For this reason I believe that in considering rules regulating
legal remainders the opposite principle applies; namely, that
actual and not possible events are to be considered. In In re
Park's Settlement, the wife of J. F. was born in the settlor's
lifetime. In In re Bullock's Will Trusts, I. B.'s husband was born
in the testator's lifetime. In Whitby v. Mitchell, the daughter,
E. H. D., was unborn at the date of the settlement. It was the
same in In re Nash, and in it re Clarke's Settlement Trusts.
This view, that actual, not possible, events must be considered
not only appears to be possible on general principles, but it
would get rid of the difficulty caused by In re Park's Settlement.
27 It is simply an application of the old rule against perpetuities, and
as we have seen, is called "the old rule against perpetuities" by
Sargant, J.
28 This did away with the necessity of appointing trustees to preserve
contingent remainders.
29 See Selborne, C., in Pearks v. Moseley (i8So) 5 App. Cas. 714, 722,
and Jessel, M. R., in Hale v. Hale, (1875) 3 Ch. Div. 643, 645.
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This difficulty, for in some way or other In re Park's Settlement
must be got rid of, wias solved by Justice Sargant by the
"prapositus" theory. This theory is attractive; but it has the
curious result that a limitation may be good, or bad, according to
the way in which the persons to take under it are described. It is
however quite possible that both the theory that actual events
should be considered and also the "prepositus" theory are true.
In almost every case that is likely to occur, either theory would
save the limitations.
There is also a third theory that the rule in Whitby v. Mitchell
"only applies where a life interest is given to a person who by
the terms of the limitation is unborn with remainder to his or
her issue." 30  This was the case in Whitby v. Mitchell, but the
rule is not stated by the judges in this limited form.
-To sum up, the English law at present appears to be:
(i) Legal Remainders in Land. These are subject to the
rule in Whitby v. Mitchell that if land is limited to an unborn
person for life with remainder to the child or children of such
unborn person, the latter remainder is void. But so stated, the
rule is not free from ambiguity. There are four possible theories:
(a) Mr. Sweet's, that "unborn" means a person who by the
terms of the limitation is unborn at the date of the settle-
ment. (b) Justice Eve's, that "unborn" means a person who
may possibly be unborn. (c) Justice Sargant's, that "the chil-
dren of such unborn person" means persons who in the limitation
are described as children of such unborn person, and does not
refer to children of such unborn person described as children of
a living person. (d) The writer's, that "unborn" means a person
actually unborn. The inconvenience of Justice Eve's view is
so great that we may take it that it will not be followed.
In 1833 legal remainders in land were not subject to the
rule in Cadell v. Palmer. There has been an attempt by judges
of first instance to alter the law in this respect. But it may be
remarked, that in In re Frost the decision was alternative, and
that in Re Ashforth3' the limitation, in fact,'was an executory
devise.
Mr. Charles Sweet holds that a further rule-that in Chapman
v. Brown32 -applies to legal contingent remainders. The rule
is that a contingent remainder cannot be limited on a contingent
30 Mr. Charles Sweet, 30 LAW QUART. REV. at p. 354.
3' [19o5] i Ch. 535; (1765) 3 Burr, 1626; 3 Br. P. C. 269.
32 See Charles Sweet, Double Possibilities, 30 LAW QUART. REV. at p. 353.
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remainder. This was the rule applied in In re Frost. The
existence of this rule is denied by Professor Gray.3 3 Whether
or not there is such a rule is a difficult question which I cannot
discuss here; but I think it probable that modern judges would
not recognize it in view of certain expressions in the judgment
of the Court of Appeal in In re Nash, and the observations on
In re Frost made by Justice Sargant in In re Bullock's Will
Trusts.
(2) Equitable Remainders in Land. These are subject both
to the rule in Whitby v. Mitchell (because they are remainders),
and to the rule in Cadeli v. Palmer (because they are equitable).
It has never been suggested that the rule in Chapman v. Brown,
if it exists, applies to equitable remainders.
(3) Executory Devises and Bequests and Equitable Interests.
These are subject to the rule in Cadell v. Palmer that they
must vest indefeasibly within a period of one or more lives in
being and twenty-one years afterwards, and if they do not, they
are void. In applying this rule possible, not actual, events are
considered.
Mr. Charles Sweet contends that executory devises and execu-
tory bequests of terms of years are also subject to the rule in
Whitbv v. Mitchell.3 4  But in In re Bowles,35 Justice Farwell
treats the rule in Whitby v. Mitchell as applying only remain-
ders, and for this reason decided that the rule does not apply
to personal property. It seems to me unlikely that Mr. Sweet's
view will be adopted.
(4) Common-law Conditions. It may be added that in 1833
common-law conditions were not subject to the rule in Cadell v.
Palmer .3  But in Re Trustees of Hollis Hospital and Hague's
Contract,3 7 and in Re Da Costa38 the rule was held to apply to
common-law conditions. The learned editor of Farwell on
Powers" points out that the condition in the latter case was bad
as a common-law condition. Nowadays common-law conditions
are rare, but until the point comes before the -Court of Appeal, it
is not possible to say what the law is at the present day.
CHARLES P. SANGER.
LINCOLN'S INN. LONDON.
33 Gray, Rule against Perpetuities (3d ed.) Appendix, K.
34 The Rule in Whitby v. Mitchell, 12 COL. L. Rav. i99.
35 [I9O2] 2 Ch. 65o.
36 (1883) Real Property Commissioners, Third Report, p. 36.
37 [1899] 2 Ch. 540.
38 [1912] 2 Ch. 337.
38 (3d ed.) p. 337.
